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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary memory models have conceptualized
the long-term storage of memories as a collection of
attributes that serve to discriminate one memory from
another (e.g., Underwood, 1969).

When we retrieve a

particular memory, we may recall not on1y the occurrence
of some past event, but also some idea as to when the
event happened (temporal attribute), where it occurred
(spatial attribute), as weli as verbal and nonverbal
associations of the memory (associative attributes).
According to this perspective, a memory cannot be retrieved
without its attributes, since the attributes are the only
l

means by which one memory is identified as being separate
from all other memories.
The present paper deals mainly with the temporal
attribute of memory.
twofold.

The reasons for this interest are

First, there is sound empirical evidence to

suggest that a temporal attribute plays a fundamentally
important role in memory retrieval.

Underwood (1969},

for example, reported that by increasing the time interval
between paired-associate lists, inter-list interference
was drastically reduced (i.e., the increased temporal
separation resulted in discriminable temporal attributes
associated with each list).

Likewise, Light and Schurr

(1973) demonstrated that providing subjects with temporal
cues in a recognition memory task (by having test items
presented in the same temporal order in which they were
1

2

studied) significantly improved their performance.
A second reason for investigating the temporal
attribute stems from the fact that it has received relatively little theoretical or empirical attention.

Tul-

ving and Madigan (1970), after a thorough review of the
pertinent literature, concluded that psychologists have
been somewhat reluctant

to_incorpor~te

bute within any precise theoretical

the temporal attri-

framewor~.

Thus, vir-

tually nothing is known about how temporal information is
stored in memory, or how it operates as an effective discriminative cue.
Beginnings of Empirical Research
A test paradigm appropriate for the empirical investigation of the temporal attribute, usually referred
to as a "judgment of recency task," was introduced by
Yntema and Trask (1963).

In this study, a long list of

words printed singly on index cards was inspected by subjects, each at his own pace.

Interspersed among study

words were test cards, each one containing two words followed by a question mark.

When a test card appeared, subjects

were asked to choose the word that occupied the more recent
position in the preceding inspection series.

Test pairs

were constructed so that either one or both of the test
items actually appeared in the inspection series.

In cases

where only one member of the test pair appeared in the
series, subjects were instructed to consider "new" test items
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as having occurred "very many words ago."
By the method outlined above, Yntema and Trask
wished to assess two major components of recency discrimination: (a) separation interval, or the number of items
that intervened between the inspection of each word comprising a test pair; and (b) lag, the number of items that
intervened between the time of inspection and the time of
test for the more recent member of a test pair.

The range

of lag and separation values manipulated in the Yntema and
Trask study was considerable, with the lowest value at 4
items, and the highest value reaching 136 items.

It was

found _that recency judgments, which were far better than
chance at all lag and separation values, became more accurate as the separation interval increased, but less accurate
as the lag interval increased.
On the basis of their results, Yntema and Trask concluded that.the temporal attribute of memory is represented
by hypothetical "time tags" that a subject examines to
determine the relative recencies of past events.

It was

also suggested that time, or something correlated with time,
comprises the time tags in memory.

Thus, the observed effect

for separation interval was explained by the fact that values
for this interval are

p~rfectly

correlated with time.

That

is, the larger the interval between members of a test pair,
the larger the time difference between their occurrence, and
presumably, the more discriminable their time tags would be.
Likewise, as the time interval between the time of study and
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the time of test (lag) increases, the discriminability
of the time tags associated with test items must decline;
and this was suggested to account for the observed lag
effect.
The concept of time tags, as presented in Yntema
and Trask (1963), has been criticized by a number of cognitive

ps~chologists.

that it is merely a

Murdock (1914), for example, argues

descripti~e

label, pointing to the fact

that people can discriminate memories on the basis of recency.

Also, Estes .(1972) concluded that the notion of

time tags does not address itself to the problem of explaining how temporal information is represented in memory;
and it is, therefore, atheoretical speculation.
Despite these criticisms, however, the concept of
time tags has stimulated further research into the problem
of recency.

Moreover, because of the theoretical weak-

nesses of the time tags hypothesis, psychologists from various theoretical backgrounds have sought to find a better,
alternative explantion.

Among the alternatives offered,

two major hypotheses (the strength hypothesis and the context hypothesis) have emerged as rival explanations for
recency phenomena.
reviewed in detail.

Each of these hypotheses will now be

TWO ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES FOR RECENCY
~ St~ength

[ypothesis

Strength theory represents a comprehensive model of
memory that has been formally presented elsewhere (Anderson

& Bower, 1972; Kintsch, 1970; Murdock, 1974; Wickelgren, 1970).
However, there are three assumptions of this model that are
pertinent to understanding the strength hypothesis for recency.

First, it is assumed that a memory is stored as

single, unidimensional "trace."

ar-.;

The exact nature of a trace

is not specifically defined, other than the fact that it is
thought to bear some physiological relationship to central
neural circuits.
Second, it is thought that activation (i.e., retrieval)
of a memory trace is accompanied by an implicit and direct
estimate of its strength.

The concept of trace strength

has been rather loosely defined, but it is often equated
with the variable of familiarity; the stronger the memory
trace, the more familiar the memory represented by the trace
appears •. Trace strength is also presumed to have a direct
influence upon the ease with which items are retrieved from
memory.

Strength theorists generally infer that the easier

it is to recall or recognize an item, the stronger its trace
strength must be.
The third and most important assumption of the model
is that trace strength diminishes, in either discrete or
continuous fashion, with the passage of time.
5

The strength
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hypothesis for recency grew directly from this assumption,
and it was summarized succinctly by Konorski (1961):
We have a strong inclination to believe that the "sense
of time" of men and other animals i.e., the sense of
varying durations of time which have elapsed since a
definitive event, is based on nothing else than the
strength of traces left by this event at various moments
after its cessation. The weaker these traces the more
remote in time the given event seems to be. (p. 122)
Thus, according to the strength hypothesis, recency judgments are mediated by the single variable of trace strength,
"

and are considered to be the by-products of the trace decay
process.
The strength hypothesis, as outlined above, has generated three major predictions for recency phenomena.

The

first prediction specifies that variables such as frequency
and repetition, which are thought to increase the strength
of memory traces, should also enhance the apparent recency
of memories represented by such traces.

To test this pre-

diction, Peterson (1967) devised a recency task in which a
long list of verbal stimuli were presented at a fixed rate.
At various times throughout the inspection list, subjects
were shown a test word that had been seen in the preceding
series, and were required to estimate lag, or the number of
items that had occurred since the test word was last seen.
The major independent variable in this study was stimulus
frequency, the number of times test words were repeated in
the inspection series before the time of test.

Half of the

items were seen only once, whereas the other half were seen
twice before appearing as a test item.

Lag intervals ranged
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from 2 to 8 items, and the first and second presentations
of repeated items were separated by four intervening words.
If the strength hypothesis was correct, repeated items
should have stronger traces than nonrepeated ones, and,
therefore, should appear more recent than nonrepeated items.
Contrary to this prediction, however, no significant
differences between_repeated and nonrepeated items were ob-served.

To interpret this finding, Peterson modified the

Q

strength hypothesis to suggest that items repeated in a
spaced fashion (i.e., repetitions separated by several intervening items) result in two separate traces with strengths
no greater than singly presented items.

Since the repeated

items in that study were presented in a spaced manner, their
lag estimates did not differ from the once-presented items
for the simple reason that their trace strengths were not
appreciably different.
It was further suggested that items presented in a
massed condition (i.e., repetitions in successive order)
would result in a slligle, strengthened trace, relative to
the traces of spaced items.

Thus, it was predicted that

massed items should appear more recent than spaced items at
the same lag interval.

In a later experiment (Peterson,

Johnson, & Coatney, 1969) this prediction was tested, and
it was found that Peterson's hypothesis was confirmed.

The

lag estimates for massed items were significantly smaller
than those for spaced items.

8

When reviewing the Peterson experiments, one should
note that the test paradigm differed somewhat from the task
originally introduced by Yntema and Trask (1963).

Peterson

observed absolute judgments of recency for individual stimuli, a task that does not entail the discrimination of recency for two different test items (i.e., a comparative
task-}-.-- Lockhart-{ 1968) was interested in seeing- whether -the
strength hypothesis, which was tested by Peterson in an absolute task, also accounts for recency data observed in a
comparative task.

To do this, Lockhart tested whether per-

formance by one groupcof subjects in an absolute task could
predict the performance by another group in a comparative
task.

If comparative judgments are made on the basis of lag

estimates for each member of a test pair, as the strength
hypothesis implies, then a probability distribution generated from an absolute task should predict the data observed
in a comparative one.

Lockhart's data confirmed the- _strength

model's predictions, and it was concluded that the processes
envisaged by the strength hypothesis for absolute tasks also
characterizes the processes involved in comparative ones.
A second major prediction of the strength hypothesis
pertains directly to comparative judgments of recency. Namely, when two items of unequal strength are presented in a
test pair, recency discrimination will be more accurate when
the item with the stronger trace is actually the more recent
member of the test pair.

Likewise, if the stronger trace
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precedes the weaker one in time, recency discrimination will
be impaired.

To test this prediction, Morton (1968) ob-

served comparative recency judgments llllder three experimental conditions: (a) when the more recent item was repeated
earlier in the inspection series; (b) when the less recent
item was repeated; and (c) when neither item was repeated.
According. to the. strength _hypothesis , __ repetition of the less
recent member should increase its trace strength relative
to the more recent one; hence, recency discrimination should
be impaired under that condition.
Test stimuli consisted of numerical digits presented
auditorially in a series of 14 other

d~gits.

Digits that

were repeated had only one item separating their first and
second presentations.

In agreement with the strength hy-

pothesis, Morton found that judgments were most accurate
when the more recent item was repeated, and least accurate
when the less recent item was repeated.
Further evidence in support of this prediction has
been found in cases where test stimuli were pictoral, rather
than verbal in nature.

It is a well-known fact that pic-

tures are easier to remember than words (e.g., Pavio, 1971).
A strength theorist interprets this to mean that the trace
strength of pictures declines less rapidly than that of
verbal stimuli.

As applied to recency judgments, the strength

hypothesis predicts that pictures should appear relatively
more recent than words at constant lag intervals.

Fozard
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and Weinert (1972) compared absolute judgments of recency
for pictures and words, and found that at relatively short
lags (13 to 14 items), pictures appeared more recent than
words.

At longer lags, however, the differences between

pictures and words disappeared.

Furthermore, Fozard (1970)

observed comparative recency judgments when test pairs
consistea.__of both_ a_ word and a picture._ It was found that
recency discrimination was impaired when the more recent
member was a word.

This latter finding is in agreement

with the Morton (1968) study, since it is assumed that the
trace strength of a picture is stronger than that of a word.
A third major prediction of the strength model involves the relationship between trace decay and decision
criteria that subjects use to transform values of strength
into estimates of lag.

Hinrichs (1970), by applying the

principles of statistical decision theory, offered a description of this transformation process.

He assumed that

values of trace strength are normally distributed about
mean values of lag.

It was further assumed that subjects

implicitly establish criterion values for strength that
demarcate the range of values associated with each lag estimate.

Thus, if the trace strength for a given stimulus

falls short of, or exceeds a particular criterion value, the
lag estimate for that stimulus is determined by the lag
value associated with the range of strength values falling
above or below that criterion.
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According to the strength hypothesis, trace strength
declines as a function of time, and is independent of any
criteria subjects may use to mediate recency judgments.

To

test this assumption, Hinrichs (1970) deceived subjects into
believing that the maximum lag interval they would experience in an absolute task was either 6, 9, or 12 items in
length.- --Actually, the-maximum-possible-lag--was---alwaya 9
items.

By this deception, it was felt that the decision

criteria were varied independently of the decay rate of
trace strength.

It was therefore predicted that the rate

of trace decay, as evidenced by the rate with which mean
estimates of lag declined with time, should be identical in
all three deception conditions.

The results fit the strength

model's predictions, and Hinrichs concluded that trace
strength declines independently of decision criteria.
Critique of Strength Hypothesis
Although the strength model has enjoyed some empirical
verification, cogent arguments against its acceptance have
been waged.

Most adversaries have based their argument on

the basic criticism that the strength hypothesis is far too
simplistic.

Its simplicity stems from the fact that it re-

lies exclusively upon the single variable of trace strength
to explain recency data.

In effect, the strength hypothesis

denies the utility of all other attributes of memory that a
person may use to determine an event's occurrence in time.
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Such extreme simplicity often renders the strength hypothesis
incapable of resolving some fundamental logical and empirical
problems.
Some of the logical problems attendant to the strength
hypothesis were noted by Underwood (1969).

One has only to

reflect upon his own personal experiences to realize that
some older__ memories_ appear_ to be much more_ vivid or _"stronger"_
ihan some more recent ones.

Yet, we are still capable of

remembering the temporal order from older to newer memories.
If recency discrimination were based solely on trace strength,
considerable disorientation in time would result.

Therefore,

the strength model is at a loss to explain how older, more
vivid memories are kept in their proper temporal position.
One of the most poignant statements of criticism against· the strength hypothesis was presented by Tulving and Madigan ( 1970) :

In our opinion, the strength hypothesis is a product of
desparation. It is entirely possible that in the- absence
of any other information the subject may correctly or
incorrectly reason that of the two items, the one appearing more familiar may look so because because it appeared
more recently, but this does not mean that the subject
has no access to more direct information about the temporal code of an item in many other situations. (p. 463)
In effect, Tulving and Madigan suggest that a simple, unidimensional variable such as trace strength mediates recency
judgments only when there are no other attributes associated
with items stored in memory.

Thus, it would be wrong to con-

clude that the sense of recency is due solely to the strength
~

of traces representing stored memories.
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In support of Tulving and Madigan's conclusion, it can
be argued that the variable of trace strength accounts for
recency data in only a few experimental settings.

Moreover,

many of the strength theorists' conclusions regarding the
efficacy of the strength variable must be restricted to situations where only short lag intervals are being observed.
A close

~xamination

of much of the data

the strength hypothesis reveals that at

~ci:ted

in support of

~onger

subjects were guessing their recency judgments.

lag intervals,
Hinrichs

and Bushke (1968), for example, reported that the accuracy
of lag estimates {in an absolute type of task) declined to
chance performance at lag intervals greater than 8 items.
Likewise, in the Morton (1968) study described earlier, subjects were making comparative judgments of recency at no
better than chance probability in two of the three experimental conditions.

As Underwood (1969) indicated, if sub-

jects are merely guessing their decisions, it is erroneous
to conclude that any v.ariable, including trace strength, is
responsible for the results.
A second limitation to the conclusions of the strength
theorists stems from the fact that their predictions have
been upheld in only one type of experimental task, the continuous or probe type of task.

Continuous tasks are char-

acterized by the fact that there is no temporal separation
between the study and test phases.

Recency judgments are

made throughout the presentation of a long series of stim-
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uli.

Bower (1972) has suggested that continuous tasks are

"impoverished" in the sense that subjects are afforded little opportunity to make recency judgments on factors other
than familiarity or strength.

This impoverishment is exem-

plified by the fact that there are no distinctive spatial
or visual cues that would help discriminate one stimulus
from another.

Furthermore, the forced presentation rate,

coupled with the temporal contiguity between the study and
test phases, do not allow subjects the opportunity to cognitively organize or rehearse the tested items.

Given such

circumstances, it is not surprising that subjects• performance rarely exceeds chance level at longer lags, or that the
variable of trace strength stands out as the most likely
explanation for the sense of recency.
Continuous types of tasks, however, are by no means
the only methods available for the investigation of recency
phenomena.

There is another class of tasks that can be

termed "discrete" in that recency judgments are delayed until
the completion _of the entire inspection series.

Discrete

tasks differ from continuous ones in two important ways: (a)
lag intervals in discrete tasks can vary over a much wider
range of values, from a few items to a few days; and (b) in
discrete tasks, there is a clear temporal separation between
the study and test phases of the experiment.

Because of

these characteristics, discrete tasks bear a stronger resemblance to real life in that recency judgments are made from

15

a retrospective vantage point from which each item is considered as a member of an entire series of past events.
There is a growing body of evidence to show that
predictions of the strength hypothesis are not upheld in
discrete types of tasks.

Underwood (1969) cited several

unpublished studies in which absolute judgments of recency
were measured by having subjects identify the temporal position of stimuli with numbe}"S corresponding to each item's
position in a presentation list.

Test words differed from

each other in terms of their study time, and it was found
that the longer a word had been studied, the easier it was
recalled on a later test.

Strength theory interprets this

to mean that' items studied for a longer time have stronger
traces than items studied for shorter times.

Accordingly,

stronger items should appear more recent (i.e., assigned to
more recent temporal positions) than weaker ones.

Contrary

to the strength hypothesis' prediction, however, position
judgments did not vary systematically with study time.

Items

studied for a longer time were not assigned to more recent
serial positions.

Underwood therefore concluded that there

is no correlation between trace strength, as manipulated by
study time, and judgments of recency.
Another failure of the strength hypothesis was noted
by Winograd (1968), who indirectly measured recency judgments in a list discrimination task.

Subjects were shown

two word lists such that List 1 was presented in its entirety
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a variable number of times before JJist 2 was presented.

In

some cases, List 1 was repeated 9 times more frequently than
List 2 was presented.

After List 2 was presented for the

last time, subjects were asked to recall the presentation
list in which test words appeared.

Strength theory assumes

that the trace strength of list items increases with the
frequency_of repetition._ Thus, in _cases where the frequency
of List 1 was much greater than that for List 2, list discrimination should be impaired.

This expectation is iden-

tical to the second major prediction of the strength hypothesis outlined earlier (cf. Fozard, 1970; Morton, 1968).
But, contrary to the strength hypothesis, Winograd found
that the accuracy of list discrimination increased, rather
than decreased, as the frequency of List 1 increased.
Further evidence against the strength hypothesis has
also been reported by Hintzman and Block (1971).

In this

study, subjects were shown a fairly long list of words,- and
were later asked to recall the temporal position of test words
randomly drawn from the presentation list.

A horizontal line

divided into ten equal segments was printed at the top of
each answer sheet, and position judgments were made by assigning a number from 1 to 10 that corresponded to the tenth of
the list in which each test item appeared.

It was found that

I

position judgments were far better for words from the beginning of the list than those from the middle or latter
portions.

17
This primacy effect observed by Hintzmah is difficult
for the strength hypothesis to explain.

If recency is rep-

resented in memory only by the strength of an exponentially
decaying trace (cf. Hinrichs, 1970), it is not clear why
the temporal positions of less recent items are better discriminated than the temporal positions of more recent items.
A strength theorist could

atgu~_~hat

items from the begin-

ning of a list have stronger traces (i.e., because of less
Q

interference) than items from other portions.

But, in that

case, the strength model would also have to predict that
beginning items be assigned to more recent serial positions.
Clearly, the data do not support any explanation offered by
the strength hypothesis, and an alternative explanation is
needed to account for Hintzman's primacy effect.
~

Context Hypothesis
The context model of memory differs from the strength

model in several important ways.

First, the context model

assumes that a memory is multidimensional i.e., comprised of
many discrete elements.

The elements comprising a memory

have been collectively termed the "stimulus-as-coded" (s-a-c),
and are thought to represent stimulus features encoded into
memory (Bower, 1972).

Consequently, the representation of

an item in memory depends upon the manner in which it was
encoded.

Further, encoding is assumed to depend upon a sub-

ject' a attentional set.

-18

The context model also assumes that associations are
immediately and implicitly formed between a s-a-c and a
multitude of other s-a-c's that correspond to contextual
stimuli present at the time of encoding.

Therefore, when

an item is retrieved from memory, contextual elements associated with the item are also retrieved.

Recognition mem-

ory is seen to depend upon the retrieval of contextual
associates.

To recognize

~hat

an item was seen before, one

must implicitly realize, through contextual retrieval, that
the item was seen in a previous context.
The context model, unlike the strength model, emphasizes the associative nature of memory to explain the sense
of recency.

As mentioned earlier, strength theory relies

upon the single variable of trace strength to explain recency
judgments.

The context model, however, proposes that the

sense of recency is mediated by the retrieval of a multitude
of elements associated with an item in memory.
Proponents of the context modei have suggested at least
two ways in which a person utilizes contextual elements to
mediate judgments of recency.

The first method, which can

be termed a "statistical scanning process," was proposed by
Bower (1972) as an explanation for recency judgments measured
in continuous types of tasks.

When an item is presented for

test, the subject supposedly is able to scan the set of retrieved elements and estimate the proportion that are "tagged"
(i.e., associated with) to the item's previous experimental
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context.

According to Bower, the greater the proportion of

tagged elements found, the nore recent the item appears.
It was further assumed that with longer time intervals between the item's presentation in the inspection series and
test (lag), the elements tagged to the previous context
would have a lower probability of being retrieved with the
test item.__ Thus, for_ absolute judgments of recency, __ the __
greater the lag interval, the less recent the item appears.
As applied to comparative judgments of recency, the
context hypothesis proposes that the test item having the
greater proportion of tagged elements is the one that will
appear more recent.

As the separation interval between items

to be compared increases, the greater the likelihood of differences between the proportion of tagged elements retrieved
with each item.

Thus, the greater the separation interval

between items to be compared, the more discriminable (in
terms of recency) the test items become.

The context model

is therefore in agreement with the finding that recency discrimination becomes more accurate as the separation interval
increases (cf. Yntema and Trask, 1963).
A second way in which subjects use contextual elements
is through contextual "tags" or "markers."

According to

Anderson and Bower (1972), contextual tags are hypothetical
labels that summarize and define a multitude of elements
appearing within a discrete interval of time.

The notion of

contextual tags has been used to explain judgments of serial
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position (e.g., Hintzman and Block, 1971).

It is thought that

"list tags" and "position tags" help a subject pinpoint the
serial position in which an item appeared.

As Anderson and

Bower (1972) explained:
The point of introducing associations to context is to
provide a means-of keeping track of the occasions in
which particular words appeared. This would be difficult to implement on the basis of direct associations
between the word and the contextual elements. How
would the subject know which contextual elements belonged
to whic~ list? (p. 104)
Presumably, the greater the differences between contexts encoded with list items, the more likely it is that
subjects will tag them differentially.

As a test of this

prediction, Brown (1973b) asked school children to make comparative judgments of recency for pairs of picture stimuli
presented under varying conditions of context.

In the Vis-

ual condition, each group of 8 items was presented in different spatial locations representing various points along
a child's journey to school (e.g., house, garden, street etc.).
In the List condition, pictures were shown in blocks of 8
items, but without extra spatial cues.

Finally, in the

Blank condition, all pictures were pres,ented in an uninter1

rupted series.
The results were in total agreement with the predictions
of the context model.

For older children, recency discrim-

ination was better in the Visual condition (77%) than in
either the List (69%) or Blank (63%) conditions.

Further-

more, judgments were most accurate when the pictures comprising test pairs came from different contexts.

In the
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Visual condition, for example, performance was 85% accurate
when items came from different contexts; whereas, judgments
were only 52% accurate when no such contextual differences
existed.

These findings were later replicated when context

was varied by having different colored backgrounds for
blocks of study items (Brown, Campione, and Gilliard, 1974).
Evaluation of the Context Hypothesis
"

The context model, unlike the strength model, can provide explanations for recency data from a variety of experimental tasks.

The theoretical superiority of the context

model in this respect can be demonstrated by reviewing two
studies mentioned earlier.

First, in the Winograd (1968)

study, the strength model would have erroneously predicted
that list discrimination would decrease as the frequency of
List 1 increased.

The context model, on the other hand,

could argue that the probability of retrieving the List 1
tag would increase with the frequency of its repetition.
Thus, the context model would agree with the Winograd data
showing improved list discrimination with List 1 repetitions.
Second, Underwood (1969) observed that the strength
model incorrectly predicted that "strong" items presented
at the beginning of the list would appear more recent than
"weaker" items from the end of the list.

According to the

context model, however, the strength or vividness of an
item has no bearing on its apparent recency other than to
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the degree to which vividness influences the formation of
discriminable list markers.

Thus, the context model would

not contradict our personal observations that temporal orientation is preserved, even though past events differ in
terms of their vividness or familiarity.
In light of the above discussion, the context hypothesis appears to be a desirable .. al terna.:tive to_ the _overlysimplistic notions of strength theory.
"

On the negative

side, however, the context model has suffered one major
criticism.

Namely, the term "context" has been treated in

much too general: a fashion.

"¢ontext," as it was originally

described by Anderson and Bower (1972), encompasses an almost
unlimited variety of elements, ranging from internal physiological cues, to the physical parameters of the external
environment.

According to Brown (1973a), the context model

has thus far been unable to specify which, among the multitude of contextual elements, are most influential in the formation of list or position tags.

As Wells (1974) pointed out:

The nature of contextual tags needs careful specification
to avoid the emptiness of the statement that one remembers context because one remembers contextual information. (p. 390)

ON THE NATURE OF CONTEXTUAL TAGS
Hintzman, Block, and Summers (1973), in a study of
serial list and position judgments, attempted to clarify the
nature of contextual tags, at least as they operate in studies of position knowledge.

Subjects were shown four word

lists separated by a 2.5 minute recognition test.

After the

last list was shown, serial position judgments were measured
by having subjects indicate both the list and within-list
position in which test items appeared.
There were three major findings in this study.
there were primacy and recency effects.

First,

The positions of

items from the beginning and end of the inspection series
were better discriminated than thosecfrom other portions of
the series.

The recency effect, however, was found to be

transitory in that prolonging the time interval between the
study and test phases of the experiment attenuated it.

Sec-

ond, errors of list discriniination tended to fall in lists
that were in closest temporal proximity to the target list.
Third, when an error of list membership occurred, the with"

in-list position judgments tended to remain accurate.

This

last finding contradicts an explicit prediction of strength
I

theory; an item assigned to the wrong list should also be
assigned to a within-list position that is temporally closest
to its actual within-list position.
To explain these results, Hintzman postulated the
existence of at least two types of contextual tags, each one
referring to a particular subset of contextual elements.
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The first type (Type A) referred to contextual elements that
might, for example, define subjects' feelings of boredom during the encoding process.

Hintzman further assumed that Type

A elements change in a regular fashion according to a negatively function of time in an experiment.

Therefore, Type

A elements are assumed to change more quickly in the beginning of an experiment, and, thus, may explain the primacy
effect.

Moreover, if Type A tags change more quickly in the
Q

beginning of a presentation series than at the middle or end,
then the positions of items in the beginning would be more
discriminable than those from other portions.
Type A elements were also used to explain errors in
list discrimination.

These elements are presumably insensi-

tive to list boundaries i.e., the rate at which they change
does not correspond to the rate at which the stimulus series
changes from one list to another.

However, Type A elements

retrieved with items from two consecutive lists might be quite
similar to each other.

It would, therefore, be reasonable to

expect that list errors fall in lists that are in closest temporal proximity to the target list.
A second type of contextual marker (Type B) hypothesized by Hintzman reflects a subset of elements that describe
the "cognitive environment" in which lists were processed.
These elements may be associated with the degree of cognitive
load or strain felt by subjects in the processing of each
list.

Type B elements were assumed to change in a regular
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fashion during the presentation of a single list, but the
original elements are reinstated whenever a new list is begun.

Consequently, items from different lists, but with the

same within-list position, share similar Type B elements
(e.g., all beginning items might be associated with a minimum. amount of strain, and end items a greater amount).

Type

B elements are used_ to _explain_the. tendency__ for within-list__ _
judgments to remain accurate when errors in list discrimination are made.
On the basis of Hintzman's interpretations, certain
tentative hypotheses can be formulated regarding the nature
of serial list and position tags: (a) List and position tags
are derived from contextual elements that describe subjects'
internal, as opposed to external environment; (b) These elements must bear some logical correspondance with the passage
of time (e.g., the greater the feeling of boredom, the longer the time spent in the· experiment); (c) The discriminability of list tags are dependent upon the rate at which Type
A elements charige through time; the faster the rate of
change, the more

discrimin~ble

the tags.

The rate of Type A

change is, in turn, a function of time in a particular experimental setting; (d) The discriminability of position tags
is dependent upon both the regularity with which Type B elements change within all lists (so that position tags are
equivalent in all lists), and the degree to which Type B
elements vary within each list (so that beginning tags are
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different from middle and end tags).
The Present Experiment
Given Hintzman's interpretations of contextual tags,
the present experiment was designed to study how certain variables of stimulus presentation would affect the discriminabili ty Qf list_ and_ pos_i tion _:tags_ in judgments of serial position.

With regard to list tags, Hintzman hypothesized
"

that the rate at which Type A elements change in an experiment is a negatively accelerated function of time in an experiment.

This hypothesis, however, was offered as a post-

hoc explanation for data collected in a study where certain
.,standard" conditions of stimulus presentation prevailed.
Moreover, Hintzman's subjects viewed stimuli presented at a
constant rate of duration (5 sec. per item), and with the
same type of

fill~r

ing between lists.

task (recognition memory test) intervenIt could be argued that such conditions

fostered a feeling of monotony or boredom (e.g., Type A elements) that might asYillptote relatively early in the experiment.

If presentation conditions were changed so that the

experiment seemed less monotonous, it would be reasonable to
expect list discrimination to improve.

This would be a neces-

sary correlate because the slope of the function describing
Type A change would asymptote earlier in the experiment than
under less monotonous conditions.
In the present study, three variables of stimulus pre-

27

sentation, presumed to influence contextual elements, were
independently manipulated in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design.
The first variable was the type of filler task intervening
between lists.

In the Same task condition, subjects worked

on an identical type of task between the presentation of
each list.

In the Different task condition, a different

kind of task separated four presentation lists.

It was felt

that the Different condition would influence position knowledge in two ways.

First, it might lessen the monotony of the

experiment by the introduction of challenging, new tasks
throughout the presentation series.

Second, since each task

represented a different cognitive activity, they might also
provide subjects with a set of labels to differentially mark
time during the presentation phase of the experiment.

It was

therefore hypothesized that list judgments.in the Different
condition would be better than those in the Same task condition.
The second variable manipulated in this study was total
study time.

In the Long time condition, subjects viewed each

stimulus for an average of 8 seconds, in the Short condition,
5 seconds.

The time interval between lists was held constant

for both levels of this variable.

Thus, the entire presenta-

tion phase for Long groups was 1.3 times longer than that
for Short groups.

It was hypothesized that the Short groups

would do better in list discrimination than Long groups.

In

the Short condition, a greater proportion of stimuli would be
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presented before any negatively accelerating function could
asymptote.

Thus, more of the items in the Short condition

would be presented under a relatively "fast" rate of change
than items in the Long condition.

It can also be seen that

the superiority of the Short study time should be most apparent in the beginning of the series (i.e., items from the latter part of the series would correspond' with any asymptote of
subjective eiperience).
The third variable manipulated was presentation pattern.
As mentioned earlier, most studies of serial position have
employed a constant rate of stimulus presentation.

In the

present experiment, the Constant condition of presentation
pattern repeated this practtce.

In the Varied condition, on

the other hand, subjects in the Short condition viewed stimuli for either 3, 5, or 7 seconds, so that an average of 5
seconds per item in each list was achieved.

Subjects in the

Long condition were shown stimuli for either 6, 8, or 10 seconds, resulting in an average of 8 seconds per item per list.
There is considerable psychophysiological evidence to suggest that subjects' attentional state would be heightened under a Varied condition.

Sokolv (1963), for example, has re-

ported that when a long series of similar stimuli are shown
at a constant rate, the physiological correlates of subjects'
orienting response {i.e., attention) quickly habituate.

How-

ever, when the duration of a stimulus changes from that of a
preceding item, as in a varied condition, the orienting re-
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sponse quickly recovers.

As applied to tests of serial po-

sition, Sokolv's data implies that the Type A function, hypothesized by Hintzman, Block, and Summers (1973), would
asymptote at a later point in the Varied condition than in
the Constant condition.

Therefore, it was hypothesized that

a varied presentation pattern would result in better list
discrimination than a constant one.
Of the three variables just described, only one

~as

expected to have any influence on within-list position tags.
Hintzman, Block, and Summers suggested that Type B elements
reflect the degree of cognitive load or strain experienced
during each lists' processing.

There are probably a num-

ber of variables affecting the cognitive load associated
with list processing.

For example, the number of items. in

each list, the particular task demands, and the time it takes
to process each list are only a few such variables.
present

expe~iment1

In the

it was reasoned that with the number of

list items and task demands held constant, subjects in the
Long condition would experience a greater degree of cognitive strain, particularly at the end of each list, than subjects in the Short condition.

Moreover, in the Long condition,

subjects would have to process each list over a much longer
time interval than subjects in the Short condition.

Thus,

subjects in the Long condition would probably experience
greater fatigue or "strain" at the end of each list than subjects in the Short condition.

Consequently, there would be
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a greater disparity between the Type B elements associated
with beginning, middle, and end items in the Long condition.
It was therefore hypothesized that the within-list position
judgments in the Long condition would be more accurate than
in the Short condition.

METHOD

Subjects
A total of 144 subjects, recruited from the undergraduate subject pool at Loyola University, were observed.
Eighteen subjects were randomly assigned to each of the 8
experimental conditions.
Stimuli
"

Stimuli were 72 black-and-white photographs of objects
likely to be seen in an urban environment {e.g., telephone
booth, barber pole, etc.).

All stimuli were screened before-

hand to insure that none represented a landmark scene familiar to subjects.
In many studies of serial position knowledge, verbal
stimuli have been used.

There were two important reasons that

prompted the use of pictures in the present study.

First, it

was essential that the stimuli have a high probability of being recognized during the test phase.

According to the con-

text model of memory, an item is n9t recognized unless contextual associates are retrieved.

Since the present study was
l

designed to investigate the effects of some variables on contextual tags, it was necessary that the position judgments
reflect decisions for items recognized as having appeared in
the experiment i.e., items whose contextual tags were retrieved.

It is a well-known fact that pictures have a higher prob-

ability of recognition than words {Shepard, 1967; Standing,
31
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Conezio, and Haber, 1970).
The second reason for using pictures stems from the
fact that the present study was designed to observe groups
with different study times.

It was therefore necessary to

insure that recognition memory did not vary with stimulus
duration.

Pavio (1971) reported that recognition memory

for pictures does not vary
seconds.

~ith

durations

gr~ater

than 3

To verify this prediction, a pilotQstudy was con-

ducted in which 68

pic~ures,

to be used in the present ex-

periment, were viewed for two different durations.

Half of

the subjects (N = 20) saw each picture for 4 seconds, and
the other half saw each picture for 8 seconds.
confirmed Pavio's prediction.

The results

The hit rate for old items

in a two-alternative forced choice recognition test was 93%,
with no sienificant differences between long and short durations, F(1,18)

= .334.

Presentation Lists
The 72 pictures were shown in four lists of 18 items
each.

Each of the three stimulus durations to be observed

in the Varied condition were randomly assigned to positions
within each list so that in each block of 6 items (corresponding to the beginning, middle, or end of each list) a
different duration occupied each odd-numbered position.
This restriction was imposed so that within each list, all
stimulus durations were equally represented within all within-list positions (i.e., beginning, middle, and end), result-
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ing in a constant study time for all four lists.
To control for any confounding effects due to the order of stimulus presentation, three different stimulus series
were constructed according to the following criteria.

First,

each stimulus occupied either an odd-numbered or even-numbered position across all three stimulus series.
stric~ion

This re-

foll9wed from the fact that only _odd-numbered stim-

uli served as test items, and it was essential that all subjects were tested on the same items.

Second, the duration

assigned to each stimulus in the Varied condition remained
constant across each of the three series.

Thus, the order

in which the presentation rate varied in all three series
remained the same (i.e., each of the durations in the Varied
condition was assigned a series position, and in each of the
thr~e

stimulus series, items were assigned positions that had

the same duration).

Third, each stimulus appeared in a dif-

ferent list in each series.

Each stimulus series was equally

represented in all experimental conditions.

Every stimulus occupying an odd-numbered position in
the presentation series was used in the test series.

There-

fore, each list and within-list position in the presentation
series was equally represented in the test list.

To control

for confounding effects due to test order, three different
series were constructed so that: (a)

I ,,... -

&

,.....i

"
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consisted of a beginning, middle, and end item from each of
the four presentation lists; and (b) Within each block of
12 items, every duration used in the varied condition was
equally represented.
Materials
Three-types of filler__ tasks_ were _chosen to fulfill
three criteria: (a) Completipn of each task did not require
detailed instructions.

Thus, subjects could spend a maxi-

mum amount of time working on the task, rather than focusing
on task instructions; (b) Each type of task to be used in
the Different condition involved a distinctly different cognitive activity.

The first type was spatial (maze puzzle),

the second type verbal (a vocabulary test used for graduate
admissions), and the third type was mathematical (algebra
problems); (c) Each type of task was challenging enough to
prevent completion within the time interval allotted.
To record serial position judgments, subjects were
asked to make a slash mark on a horizontal line (one for
each test item) divided into four equal segments.

Each con-

secutive segment corresponded to one of the four presentation lists. .The segments corresponding to each list were
further subdivided into three equal parts representing the
beginning, middle, and end of each list.

Thus, the accuracy

of list and position judgments could be ascertained by noting whether the slash marks were placed in the appropriate
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list and within-list segment.
Besides serial position judgments, the test sheets
also contained a 5-point scale representing the confidence
of subjects' judgments.

If the subject felt he was guessing,

he was to circle Number 1.

All other numbers indicated

ascending degrees of confidence, with Number 5 reflecting
decisions for which subjects were "Very Sure."
Procedure
Subjects were seen in pairs and were given the following instructions prior to viewing the presentation series:
This is an experiment dealing with the relationship between human memory and certain mental aptitudes. You
will be shown a fairly long series of pictures. Please
pay close attention, because your memory for these pictures will be tested later in the experiment.
At various times throughout the picture series, the pictures will stop. When this happens, you are to begin
work on a paper-and-pencil task that I will give to you.
The instructions for each task are simple, and must be
read quickly and silently. I will not entertain any
questions either before or during each task•- You will
have a limited amount of time on each test, so work as
quickly and effeciently as you can. When I tell you to
stop, cease what you're doing immediately, and put the
test face down in front of you. The pictures will then
resume, and you will not return to the task once I've
told you to stop. When the last picture in the series
is shown, I'll give you further instructions.
Several aspects of these instructions should be noted.
First, subjects did not know the nature of the serial position test during the presentation phase of the experiment.
This was done to prevent subjects from using encoding strategies that may not generalize to real world settings.

Sec-
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ond, subjects were led to believe that the tasks represented
measures of their mental aptitudes.

By doing this, it was

hoped that their involvement and attention with each task
would be maximum.
Pictures :i.n the presentation series were shown on a
Kodak Carousel projector, and the presentation rates were
automatically timed.

The filler tasks were administered

after the first, second; and third lists.
given 2 min. to work on each test.

Subjects were

In the Same task condi-

tion, three different samples of one type of

task_~ere

given,

and each type of task (i.e., spatial, verbal, and mathematical)
was used equally often in that condition.

In the Different

task condition, a sample of each of the three types of tasks
were given.

Three different orders of task administration

were used equally often: spatial-verbal-math; math-spatialverbal; verbal-math-spatial.
After the last list was presented, there was a 2 min.
period prior to test in which answer sheets were distributed
and test instructions given.

During the test phase, each of

the 36 test items was presented for 10 sec.

RESULTS
Serial position judgments were scored according to
three criteria of accuracy, each criterion being treated as
a separate dependent variable in the analyses.

These cri-

teria were: (a) List accuracy-was the list in which an item
appeared remembered?; (b) Position accuracy-was the withinlist position remembered (i.e., beginning, middle, or end),
even though the item might have been placed in the wrong
list?; (c) List-Plus accuracy-was both the list and withinlist position of a test item recalled?
These criteria were used for two basic reasons.

First,

it was assumed that each criterion represented a different
aspect of contextual retrieval.

Successful list judgments

presumably require the retrieval of list tags, position judgments require within-list position tags, and List-Plus accuracy requires both types of tags.

Second, the criteria were

viewed as representing varying degrees of task difficulty
(with List-Plus the most difficult), and were therefore included to assess the degree to which the experimental variables might affect judgments differentially.
An examination of subjects' raw scores indicated that

position knowledge was better than chance for each of the
three criteria.

For List accuracy, the mean number correct,

out of a possible 36, was 16.5 (chance

= 9.0).

The corre-

sponding means for the Position and List-Plus criteria were
14.0 (chance= 12.0), and 7.0 (chance= 3.0) respectively
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(see Table 1).
Subjects' raw scores were transformed to response probabilities.

Moreover, subjects' list and position judgments

were not evenly distributed among all possible response categories.

With regard to list assignments, for example, sub-

jects assigned items to Lists 2 and 3 far more frequently than
to Lists 1 or 4.

Also, the within-list assignments were bi-

ased in favor of the middle positions (see Table 2).
"

The uneven distribution among response categories was
interpreted to mean that subjects exhibited a guessing bias
for this particular task.

Thus, to appropriately test the

hypotheses of the present experiment, it was first necessary
to correct each subject's score for his particular guessing
bias (e.g., the raw number correct of list judgments for List

3 items might be greater than that for List 1; but such a
difference would be due to the fact that when guessing, subjects tend to assign items to List 3 rather than to List 1).
A correction for guessing was used in which the raw scores
for each of the scoring criteria were transformed by dividing
the raw number correct for a given list and/or position, by
the frequency with which a subject used the list and/or position as a response category.

This resulted in post-hoc

probabilities of a correct response (cf. Hintzman et al.,
1973).

Following the above transformations, the response probabilities for each of the three scoring criteria were separ-
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TABLE 1

RAW NUMBER CORRECT BY GROUPS

List
Group

M

SD

Positioh
M

SD

List-Plus
M

SD

Long
Same-Con.

16.6

(3.6)

13.8

(3.0)

7 .()

(2.8)

Same-Var.

16.3

(3.4)

14 .1

(3.5)

1.2

(2.8)

Di ff-Con.

16.2

(3.5)

14.6

(2.2)

6.9

(2.5)

Diff-Var.

15.8

(3.7)

14.0 {3.0)

7.5

(3.0)

Same-Con.

16.6

{3.2)

14.6

(3.0)

7.3

(2.7)

Same-Var.

17.8 {4.2)

13.3

{3.6)

7 .1

(2.9)

Diff-Con.

15.3

(3.0)

13. 9 {3.5)

6 .1

( 1 •9)

Diff-Var.

17.0

(2.2)

13.2

(2.6)

6.9

{2.2)

Short
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TABLE 2
RESPONSE FREQUENCY OF CATEGORIESa

Position
B

M

E

Mean

., List 1

.047

.050

.058

.153

List 2

.066

.128

.093

.288

List 3

.108

.141

.107

.354

List 4

.081

.094

.025

• 201

Mean

.304

.412

.284

a

Percentage scores
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ately analyzed within an appropriate ANOVA design.

It should

be noted, however, that before these analyses were conducted,
the control variables of presentation series and task order
were tested for any main effects or interactions.

No sig-

nificant differences between series, F(2, 63) = 1.23; p • • 30,
or task order, F(2, 63)

= .23,

were found.

"

To test for list accuracy, the probabilities of a correct list response for items from each list were computed,
and analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 2 x 18 x 4 ANOVA design (Task x
Presentation Pattern x Time x Subjects x List); with subjects
nested within the Task x Pattern x Time interaction, and repeated across lists.
408) = 200; p.

A main effect for List was found, F(3,

.001; with items from Lists 1 and 4 resulting

in better discrimination than those from 2 or 3 (see Figure
1) •

There were no main effects for any of the betweengroup variables.

However, by comparing the upper panels with

the lower panels in Figure 1, an interaction between Time and
Pattern is indicated.

The Varied condition enhanced list dis-

crimination for the Short time relative to the Long time.
This interaction reached a level of statistical significance,
F(1, 136)

= 4-34;

p • • 04.

A simple effects analysis for the

variable of Pattern showed that the differences between Constant and Varied groups in the Short condition approached sig-
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nificance, F(1, 136) = 3.48; p • • 06.
Position Accuracy
To test for position accuracy, the correct response
probabilities for each within-list position (i.e., beginning,
middle, and end positions summed across all Lists) were computed and-analyzed within a-2 x 2 x-2x 18 x-3 ANOVA design
(Task x Pattern x Timex Subjects x Position); with subjects
nested in the Task x Pattern x Time interaction, and repeated
across Positions.
272) = 30.9; p.

A main effect for Position was found, F(2,

.001; beginning items having better accuracy

than middle or end items.
Figure 2 describes the probabilities of correct position judgments for all the experimental groups.

By comparing

the upper panels with the lower panels, an interaction between Time and Position is suggested.

Under the Long condi-

tion, end items were better recalled than middle items; whereas, under the Short time, end items were poorer than middle
items, F(2, 272)

= 3.24;

p.

.04.

A simple effects analysis

for the variable of Time showed that for end items, Long
groups were significantly better than Short groups, F(1, 408)

= 6.66;

p • • 01.
The position data were examined in more detail by sep-

arating the mean correct response probabilities for each position into two components: (a) the probability of a correct
position response in the right list; and (b) the probability
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of a correct position response in the wrong list (see Table

3).

From Table 3, it is clear that subjects tended to re-

member an item's within-list position, even when errors in
list discrimination occurred.

Note that for middle and end

items, the response probabilities in the wrong list were generally equal to or higher than those in the right list.
a pattern
triev~

couldnot~occurr_unless_subjects

Such

were able to re-

position tags somewhat independently of list tags.

Clearly, Hintzman et al's.{1973) finding (i.e., the tendency
for correct·position responses in wrong list) for verbal stimuli, was replicated for picture stimuli in the present experiment.
List-~

Accuracy

To test for List-Plus judgments, the response probabilities for items from each of the three positions within each
list were computed and analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 2 x 18 x 4 x

3 ANOYA design (Task x Pattern x Time x Subjects x List x
Position); with subjects nested in the Task x Pattern x Time
interaction, and repeated across the List x Position interaction.

Main effects for List, F{3, 408) = 91.9; p.

and Position, F(2, 272)

= 76.9;

p • • 001, were found.

.001;
Items

from Lists 1 and 4 were assigned more accurately than those
from Lists 2 or 3, and the correct response probabilities for
beginning items were better than those for middle or end items.
From Figure 3, which depicts the response probabilities
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TABLE 3
POSITION DATA INTO SEPARATE COMPONENTS

Probabilities of Correct Position Response
Right List

Wrong List
-----

Groups

-

---

B

M

E

B

M
"

E

Same-Con.

.28

.16

.15

.16

.18

.24

Same-Var.

.27

.16

.13

.17

.20

.26

Diff-Con.

.25

.13

• 21

• 21

.23

.20

Diff-Var.

.27

.16

.23

.16

.20

.17

.21

.15

.18

.18

.20

.22

Same-Con.

.30

.16

.15

.20

.22

.19

Same-Var.

.29

.18

.14

.15

.17

.20

Dif:f-Con.

.21

.14

• 11

.20

• 23

.21

Di:ff-Var.

.25

.18

.17

.17

.17

.16

Mean Short

.28

.16

.14

.18

.20

.19

Total Mean

.275

.155

.16

.18

.20

• 21

Long

Mean Long

Short

-
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for all of the experimental groups, it can be seen that in

7 of the 8 groups, beginning items from List

1 (1B), and end

items from List 4 (4E) have the highest correct response
probabilities.

Thus, for the most part, the primacy and re-

cency effects reported for verbal stimuli (e.g., Hintzman et
al., 1973) was further replicated in the present experiment
for pictures.
Q

The only exception to that finding is seen in

the condition of Short time, with Different tasks and a Constant rate (second panel of Figure 3) •
Confidence
In addition to observing accuracy, the confidence of
each subject's decision for each list and within-list position was analyzed within a design described for List-Plus
accuracy.

For the most part, subjects• degree of confi-

dence corresponded to their degree of response accuracy;
the higher the correct response probability, the greater the
confidence.

Table 4 shows the mean confidence judgments for

each position within_ each list.
408)

= 69.7;

Main effects for List, F(3,

p • • 01; and Position, F(2, 272)

= 13.1;

p•

• 01, were found; as well as a List x Position interaction,

F(6, 816)

= 57.3;

p • • 001.

Effects of Duration

An analysis was also performed to test for any main
effects or interactions for the variable of stimulus dur-
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TABLE 4
MEAN CONFIDENCE OVER ALL SUBJECTS
Position
B

M

E

List 1

4.06

3.10
"

2.88

List 2

2.69

2.75

2.79

List 3

2.67

2.80

2.86

List 4

2.88

2.94

3.29

-50

'

ation.

As mentioned earlier, in Varied groups stimuli were

presented for one of three durations, with 4 sec. between
the shortest and longest durations.

To test for the effects

of stimulus duration, the raw number correct for each duration was computed according to each of the three scoring criteria.

These data were then analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 18 x

3 .ANOVA design (Task x_Time x-Subjects x Duration), with subjects nested in the Task x Time interaction, and repeated
across Duration.

On all three criteria, a main effect for

duration was found: List accuracy, F(2, 136) = 3.45; p.
Position accuracy, F(2, 136)
(2, 136)

= 19.0;

p • • 001.

= 10.7;

p.

.03;

.005; List-Plus, F

From Table 5, it can be seen

that the long durations resulted in more accurate judgments
than medium or short durations.
Of particular interest in Table 5 is the absence of
any main effects for total study time.

M~~eover,

there were

no consistent differences between Long and Short scores for
each of the durations (recall that durations in Long were 6,
8, and 10 sec., and 3, 5, and 8 sec. in the Short condition).
For example, on list discrimination, the scores of the Short
groups tended to be better than those in the

This

Long~

corresponds to the previously reported finding that the Varied
rate enhanced list judgments in the Short, but not in the
Long condition.

For position accuracy.,

Long groups tended to do better than

o~ .. -th~ _ot~er

Sho~_groups,

hand,

a finding

congruent with the fact that the Long condition facilitated
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TABLE 5
ACCURACY FOR ITEMS OF EACH DURATION
(Mean Uumber Correct)

Mean

Duration

s

M

L

"

List
Long

4.91

5.33

5.86

5.37

Short

5.55

6.08

5.80

5 .81

Mean

5.23

5.70

5.83

Long

4.16

4.33

5.61

4.70

Short

4.41

4.02

4.86

4.43

Mean

4.29

4.18

5.23

Long

1.88

2 .16

3.33

2.46

Short

2.05

2.16

2.11

2.33

Mean

1.97

2.16

3.05

Position

List-Plus
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performance for end items.

Thus, it appears that time per

was not responsible for the duration effects.

~

Rather, var-

iation of stimulus duration seemed to affect subjects in a
relative fashion, within the context of a particular total
study time.
Mean Placement Qf Items
Finally, an analysis was conducted to determine the
effects of duration upon the mean placement of test items.
Recall that each test item could be assigned to any one of
12 line segments, representing each within-list position of
every presentation list.

Depending on where a subject assign-

ed a test item, his slash mark on the answer sheet was translated into a number corresponding to the particular line segment (i.e., 1 =beginning of List 1, 2 =middle of List 1,

4 =beginning of List 2, etc.).

These numbers were then

analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 18 x 3 ANOVA design (Task x Time x
Subjects x Duration); with Subjects nested in the Task x Time
interaction and repeated across Duration.
This analysis bears directly upon a prediction of
strength theory; items of longer duration should result in
stronger traces, and should, therefore, be assigned to more
recent serial positions than items of shorter duration.

Str-

ength theory would also expect a main effect for total study
time, with Long groups assigning items to more recent serial
positions than Short groups.

Contrary to these predictions,
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there were no main effects for total study time; and in
Varied groups, iteI)ls presented for the shortest durations
(i.e., either 3 or 6 sec., depending upon the total study
time) were assigned to more recent, rather than less recent
serial positions, F(2, 136)

= 4.85;

"

p.

.009 (see Table 6).
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TABLE 6
MEAN PLACEMENT FOR ITENS OF EACH DURATION

Duration

Groups

s

M

L

Same-Long

7.09

1.00

6.62

Diff-Long

1.06

6.75

6.62

Mean-Long

7.07

6.87

6.62

Same-Short

6.93

6.90

6.68

Diff-Short

6.82

6.84

6.76

Mean-Short

6.88

6.87

6.72

Total Mean

6.98

6.87

6.66

DISCUSSION
Of the four hypotheses tested in this experiment, only
two received some empirical support.

The first one pre 1icted

that Varied groups would be better list discriminators than
Constant groups.

It was found, in line with this prediction,

that a varied rate enhanced performance, but only under the
condition of Short study time.

Failure to find the predicted

effect under the Long time can be explained by recalling WeQ

ber's law: as the absolute value of a stimulus increases,
sensitivity to change in the stimulus decreases.

The varia-

tion in stimulus duration in the Long condition (6, 8, or 10
sec.) was probably not as noticeable as the variation in the
Short condition (3, 5, or 7 sec.).

In support of this posi-

tion, it should be mentioned that many of the subjects in the
Short-Varied groups commented that they were aware of the variation in duration; whereas, few, if any, of the the subjects
in the Long-Varied groups did the same.
In the present experiment, it was hypothesized that a
varied rate would enhance list discrimination through its effects upon the subjects' attentional state; which, in turn,
would influence the slope of Hintzman's hypothetical Type A
function.

However, in view of the additional finding that

list discrimination improved with stimulus duration, it might
be argued that the varied rate enhanced performance only because, in that condition, some stimuli were presented for a
longer time than in the Constant condition.

This counter-

argument can be rejected for at least two reasons.
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First,
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in the Varied condition, there were as many stimuli with durations shorter than those in the Constant, as there were
stimuli with longer durations.

Thus, the beneficial effects

of the longer durations in th_e Varied condition would have
been cancelled by the equal number of shorter durations.

Sec-

ond, if the varied rate enhanced performance only because of
longer durations,the effect should_also have been observed
in the Long condition.

Clearly, the data support

t~e

posi-

tion that a varied rate helps list discrimination because of
its effects on subjects' attentional state.
The other hypothesis to receive empirical support was
one that predicted that subjects in the Long condition would
,

show more accurate within-list position judgments than subjects in the Short condition.

It was reasoned that a long

study time would increase subjects' experience of cognitive
strain during the processing of each list, thereby improving
the discriminability of position tags (i.e., by increasing
the disparity between the degree of load associated with beginning, middle, and end items).

Consistent with this pre-

diction, it was found that Long groups were more accurate in
their judgments for end items than Short groups.

Of partic-

ular interest, however, was the failure to find similar group
differences for beginning and middle items.

Moreover, if the

Long condition increased the experience of cognitive strain,
one would have also expected the discrimination between beginning and middle positions to improve as well.
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Why did the Long time affect end items only?

A possi-

ble explanation can be found by recalling subjects' response
biases shown in Table 2.

For reasons not clearly understood,

subjects assigned test items to response categories representing end positions much less frequently than they did to middle or beginning positions.

This could be interpreted to

mean that criteria, implicitly used by subjects to define and
describe end positions, were much more stringent and precise
than those for beginning or middle positions.

It is also

helpful to recall that "end" items were arbitrarily defined
as those stimuli occupying the 13th, 15th, and 17th positions
within each list.

Thus, it was very difficult to distinguish

middle items (7th, 9th, and 11th positions) from some of the
end items.

In the Short condition, the degree of cognitive

strain associated with end items was probably not great enough
to warrant their assignment to an end response category.

In

the Long condition, subjects probably experienced an added
degree of strain while encoding end items, and this added
amount would help them distinguish end positions from middle
positions.
Besides affecting within-list position judgments, the
variable of Time was also hypothesized to affect list discrimination.

According to Hintzman, Block, and Summers (1973),

the amount of time per

~

subjects spend in an experimental

setting is a crucial factor in the accuracy of list judgments.
Presumably, the longer the time spent in a setting, the more
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likely it is that subjects will encode stimuli within a psychological context (i.e., feelings of boredom) whose elements
have reached an asymptote of change.

Thus, it was predicted

that list judgments would be better under the condition of a
relatively short presentation time.

The present experiment,

however, failed to confirm this hypothesis; the variable of
study time had no effect on list judgments.
It could be argued that in

~he

present experiment, the

differences between the Long and Short presentation times were
not large enough to show any noticeable differences in list
discrimination.

Recall that the presentation phase (includ-

ing task intervals) in the Long condition lasted for 15.6
min., or approximately 1.3 times longer than the corresponding time in the Short condition (12 min.).

Obviously, fur-

ther research could test this argument by making the time
differences between Long and Short groups greater.

However,

the present author has concluded that the variable of total
time

per~

will have little effect, even if the differences

between Long and Short groups were more extreme.

Moreover,

from Hintzman's assumptions, it follows that the superiority
of a shorter time should be most apparent in the beginning of
a series.

Thus, in the present experiment, Short groups_

should have performed better than Long groups in at least the
first two lists.
expectation.

The data, however, do not agree with this

In fact, the best performance for List 1 items

was given by a group under the Long condition (see Figure 1;
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Long-Same-Varied with .81 mean correct response probability).
Rather than time per

~

in an experimental setting, it

might be better to consider subjects' experience of time
spent in a setting, as a crucial factor in list discrimination.

Some psychologists have recently advanced the hypo-

thesis that a person's sense of duration is dependent, at
least in part, upqn the number of stimuli he encodes in a
finite interval of time.

Ornstein (1974) and Block (1974)

have both demonstrated that a time interval filled with the
presentation of 80 stimuli appears to be longer than one
filled with 40 stimuli.

In the present experiment, the num-

ber of items encoded by the Long and Short groups were identical, and it is therefore conceivable that the experience of
temporal duration in both groups was comparable.

Thus, the

failure to find differences between these groups in the present study might be explained by considering Ornstein's data.

If the experience of duration was equivalent in both

groups, the hypothetical Type A function probably reached
asymptote at similar points along the presentation series in
both the Long and Short conditions.
Failure to confirm the fourth experimental hypothesis,
that predicted better list discrimination in the Different
task condition, necessitates yet another revision of Hintzman' s assumptions regarding the Type A function.

As explain-

ed earlier, Hintzman assumed that the function of Type A
contextual change extended throughout the presentation phase
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of an experiment.

This implied that subjects' activities

between, as well as within lists, would affect the slope of
the function, and, thus, list discrimination.

Contrary to

that position, however, the present experiment found no evidence that subjects' interlist activities affected list
judgments.

The subjective experience (e.g., feelings of

boredom) associated with stimulus lists was the same, whether a novel

OF

repetitive task intervened between them.

This latter finding is rather hard to understand intuitively, especially in view of the fact that subjects were
under the erroneous impression that the filler tasks were to
be used as measures of their mental aptitudes.

Most all of

the subjects in the Different task condition appeared to be
highly motivated during each type of task, and many of them
expressed concern over their failure to complete the tests
during the 2 min. intervals.

In the Same task condition,

however, many subjects reported that after the task type was
repeated for the second time, they began to suspect their
·true function in the experiment, and were, therefore, not as
concerned about their performance.

For this reason aJorre,

one would have expected the different tasks to have had some
effect on list judgments.

Apparently, no matter how motivated

or involved.subjects might have been with filler tasks, each
succeeding presentation list was experienced in a similar fashion.
However, it is quite possible that the manipulation of
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Different tasks in the present experiment was not enough to
alter subjects' psychological context.

Moreover, it could

be that the subjects treated the filler tasks the same, regardless of their nature.

Perhaps a more powerful manipu-

lation would entail the comparison of Task/No-Task groups.
Underwood (1969), for example, cited several studies to show
that subjects allowed to engage in various physical activities between lists (e.g., walking out of the

experimenta~

room for a drink of water) showed reduced inter-list interference on a paired-associate learning task.

The reduced

interference between lists was interpreted to mean that those
subjects had established bet'ter temporal discrimination between the lists.

As applied to the context hypothesis, this

finding would lead to the prediction that various physical
activities between lists would result in better list discrimination than filler tasks between lists.
There was another finding in the present study that was
totally unexpected.

In the Different-Short-Constant condition,

subjects failed to show the usual strong recency effect for
4E items.

This was particularly surprising, since previous

research has shown the recency effect to be quite pervasive
(e.g., Guenther and Marigold, 1975; Hintzman and Block, 1971;
Underwood, 1969).

Until now, the only way known to attenuate

this effect was by prolonging the time interval between the
presentation of the last series items, and the time of test
(e.g., Guenther and Marigold, 1975; Hintzman et al., 1973).
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Hintzman et al. (1973) hypothesized that at short retention
intervals, subjects infer additional recency information for
items at the end of a series from the degree to which contextual elements associated with these items match contextual elements prevailing at the time of test.

At longer re-

tention intervals, however, the degree to which elements
retrieved with test items match prevailing contextual eleQ

ments would be reduced.

Thus, the attenuation of the re-

cency effect at longer intervals was explained.
In the present experiment, however, the retention interval between the presentation and test phases of the session were identical for all experimental groups.

Thus,

Hintzman's hypothesis would be hard-pressed to explain why
the Short-Different-Constant group failed to show the strong
recency effect.

No immediate explanation for this finding

can be offered by the present author.

However, the results

clearly indicate that Hintzman's original interpretation for
recency effects must be re-examined.
Present Findings in Perspective
The results of the present experiment indicate that
·two of Hintzman's assumptions regarding the nature of contextual change (i.e., Type A elements) need to be revised or
modified.

First, time per

~

in an experimental setting does

not appear to be the determining factor in the slope of a
Type A function.

Rather, time as experienced in a situation
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might be a better way of conceptualizing the abcissa of a
hypothetical Type A function.

Second, Type A elements

associated with list items appear to be unaffected by the
nature of inter-list tasks.

It is quite possible that other

types of inter-list activities (i.e., activities that do not
entail paper-and-pencil tests) could alter the slope of a
Type A function, but further research is needed to determine this.
"

Although the above results contradict some assumptions
regarding Type A change, they should not be interpreted to
mean that all of Hintzman's ideas about contextual change
are wrong.

Quite the contrary, the present experiment did

observe enhanced list discrimination with a varied rate (i.e.,
marginally significant under a Short time), and this prediction followed directly from Hintzman's premise that subjects attentional state (or "feelings of boredom" in Hintzman' s terms) ·is of fundamental importance in the formation of
discriminable list tags.

Furthermore, the fact that within-

list position judgments appear to operate somewhat independently of list judgments agrees with Hintzman's notion that
there are separate list (.Type A elements) and position (Type
B elements) tags.

Finally·, the finding that Long groups per-

formed better for end items than Short groups is congruent
with the idea that Type B elements might reflect the degree
of cognitive load or strain associated with stimuli.
Of particular interest in the present study, was the
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finding that in both Long and Short Varied groups, items of
shorte.st duration were assigned to more recent serial positions than items of longer duration.

As mentioned earlier,

this result contradicts an explicit prediction of strength
theory.

The context hypothesis, however, is able to offer

the following post-hoc explanation for these data.
relative increases in an

ite~'s

With

duration, the greater the

likelihood that Type A and B elements associated with the
Q

item change during its presentation.

(This would, by the

way, also explain why the accuracy of judgments improved with
relative increases in duration.)

When a subject retrieves

an item's contextual elements at the time of test, he might
implicitly realize that some items are associated with a
greater degree of contextual change than others.

That is,

items of longer duration would be associated with more contextual change than items of shorter duration.

Because of this

implicit recognition, subjects might have the tendency to
assign longer items to less recent response categories.
Moreover, according to Hintzman's interpretations, items are
correctly assigned to the beginning of a series (i.e., the
primacy effect) because they were encoded in the midst of
greater contextual change.

It could be that items of longer

duration are assigned to earlier serial positions for the
same reason.
Conclusions
In light of the above discussion, the present author
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concludes that Hintzman's interpretations of the context
hypothesis offers the best possible explanation for serial
position knowledge that is currently available.

It should

be emphasized, however, that the Type A and Type B elements
hypothesized by Hintzman are not meant to serve as explanations for all types of recency phenomena.

Rather, Type A

and B elements appear to be the most likely mediators of
contextual tags in tests of serial position.
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